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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

JACKY BOBO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.

890606-CA

Priority No.

2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, and unlawful possession of cocaine without tax stamps
affixed, a third degree felony, in the Second Judicial District
Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant is precluded from raising a claim

of illegal search and seizure where the appellate record does not
establish that defendant's guilty plea was conditioned upon the
right to appeal the suppression issue?
2.

Whether defendant's consent to search his apartment

was voluntary under the protections of the United States
Constitution?
3.

Whether defendant failed to assert separate state

constitutional analysis in the trial court below and is thus
precluded from raising the issue on appeal?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Const, art. I, § 14:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath of affirmation, particular describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of
a controlled substance with intent to distribute (to wit:
cocaine and psilocybin mushrooms), both second degree felonies,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(1) (Supp. 1988);
two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
without tax stamps affixed, both third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (Supp. 1989); and one
count of possession of a controlled substance (to wit:
marijuana) a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(b)(5) (Supp. 1988) (R. 5). Defendant pled guilty to
one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute (to wit:

psilocybin mushrooms), a second degree

felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony, on

-2-

August 15, 1989, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and
for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Rodney S. Page,
Judge, presiding (R. 29).
Judge Page sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences
of zero to five years and one to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison (R. 44, 46). Defendant's prison sentence was stayed and
he was placed on probation with the requirement that he serve six
months in the Davis County Jail. Ld.

Defendant was also ordered

to pay a fine in the amount of $2,000 and an additional 25%
surcharge for the victim's reparation fund. Id.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 6, 1988, Officers Kevin Allred and Terry
Gardner of the Layton City Police Department were dispatched to
defendant's apartment after receiving a complaint about a loud
party involving juveniles (T. 1).

Defendant answered the door

and invited the officers inside to ensure that no juveniles were
present (T. 2). Once inside the apartment, Officer Allred
noticed a horned pipe sitting on a kitchen counter (T. 2).
Allred picked up the pipe and smelled an odor which he identified
as marijuana (T. 2). Defendant was then placed under arrest
(T. 3).
When defendant was searched incident to arrest, a vial
containing a white powdery substance later determined to be
cocaine was found in defendant's pocket (T. 3f 17). Officer
"TM refers to the unofficial transcript of
hearing which is contained in an envelope at
record. "R" refers to the trial record. The
below that defendant's motion to suppress be
the unofficial transcript of the preliminary
-3-

the preliminary
p. 18 of the trial
parties stipulated
submitted based upon
hearing (R. 77).

Allred asked defendant for permission to search defendant's
apartment (T. 3). Defendant did not respond, and Allred
immediately contacted the Davis County Attorney's Office to
prepare a search warrant (T. 3).
When Allred informed defendant that they were seeking a
search warrant, defendant told Allred that he had never said that
Allred could not search the apartment but simply that he had not
said that he could (T. 3). Allred informed defendant that
because he had not consented to a search, he was pursuing the
alternate route of seeking a search warrant (T. 4). Defendant
responded that Allred could search the apartment and assured
Allred that there were no more drugs in the apartment (T. 4).
Allred indicated to defendant that he would wait for other
officers to arrive before searching the apartment (T. 4).
Shortly thereafter, Detective David Nance of the Davis
County Metro Narcotics Squad arrived at the scene (T. 14-15).
Nance observed defendant handcuffed and sitting on the couch. Id.
After determining that defendant had received his Miranda rights,
Nance initiated a conversation with defendant (T. 15). Defendant
once again indicated that he had not told Allred that he could
not search the apartment, but rather, that he had not told Allred
that he could (T. 15, 21). Nance informed defendant that the
county attorney was in the process of preparing a search warrant
and that if defendant consented to a search, it would speed up
the process (T. 15). Defendant indicated he was in a "hurry to
get it over with" and would give his permission for the police to
search his apartment (T. 16, 21). Before searching, Nance

-4-

contacted Steve Major of the Davis County Attorney's Office who
indicated that defendant's consent was a sufficient basis to
search the apartment (T. 16).
Detective Nance then asked defendant if there were any
drugs in the residence (T. 17). Defendant disclosed that
marijuana was contained in the freezer section of the
refrigerator (T. 4, 17). Subsequently, marijuana was discovered
in the freezer (T. 4, 17).

Additionally, police found a baggie

of cocaine and a baggie of psilocybin mushrooms in a safe in the
master bedroom (T. 17).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant may only attack the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress from his guilty plea conviction if the
defendant, prosecutor and trial judge agreed that the guilty plea
was conditioned upon the right to appeal the order on the motion
to suppress.

The minute entry of the guilty plea hearing is the

only appellate record document which sets forth the events of the
plea hearing.

There is no indication in the minute entry that

defendant's plea was conditionally entered.

In the absence of

clear record evidence that defendant's plea was conditional, this
Court should not consider defendant's attack on the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress.
Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his
apartment by the police. Consent is a recognized exception under
the United States Constitution to the requirement that police
secure a search warrant.

Defendant's consent was freely given,

and the police did not coerce or trick defendant to consent to
the search.
-5-

Defendant's claim that his rights under the Utah
Constitution were violated should not be considered where
defendant did not support his claim with state constitutional
analysis in the court below.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD ON
APPEAL TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENDANT ENTERED
AND THE TRIAL COURT ACCEPTED A CONDITIONAL
GUILTY PLEA THAT SPECIFICALLY PRESERVED THE
SUPPRESSION ISSUE FOR APPEAL, DEFENDANT IS
PRECLUDED FROM ALLEGING DENIAL OF HIS RIGHTS
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 AS A GROUND FOR REVERSAL OF HIS
CONVICTION.
On appeal, defendant attacks the trial court's denial
of his motion to suppress evidence seized by police pursuant to a
consent search of his apartment.

He claims that the search and

seizure violated the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Defendant's claim should not be considered by this Court
It is settled law that a voluntary guilty plea is a
waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues,
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations (e.g.,
fourth amendment issues).

State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah

Ct. App. 1988); State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

See also State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978)

(per curiam); State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977).

However,

in Sery, this Court created an exception to this general rule,
noting that:
[it] is inapplicable where . . . the plea
entered by the defendant with the consent of
-G-

the prosecution and accepted by the trial
judge specifically preserves the suppression
issue for appeal and allows withdrawal of the
plea if defendant's arguments in favor of
suppression are accepted by the appellate
court. . • .
758 P.2d at 938 (emphasis added).

The question in the instant

case is whether defendant's guilty plea satisfied the requirement
of Sery.regarding conditional pleas.
In State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), this Court considered a similar issue.

After the

trial court denied his motion to suppress, Mclntire pled guilty
to several charges.

This Court determined that the guilty plea

was unconditional and was entered freely, voluntarily and
2
intelligently.
Based on those facts and the absence of any
language "conditioning the plea on Mclntires's right to appeal
the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress," the Court
held that Mclntire was precluded from raising fourth amendment
issues on appeal.

93 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19.

More recently, in State v. Langdon, No. 880370-CA, slip
op. at 2 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1990) (unpublished) (see
Appendix "A"; Memorandum Decision), this Court found that a
defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to suppress
where there was no indication in the appellate record that the
plea was conditional as authorized by Sery.

In the absence of a

The opinion in Mclntire was withdrawn prior to publication in
the Pacific Reporter because the Court subsequently learned that
Mclntire had actually entered a conditional plea and therefore,
under Sery, was not precluded from raising fourth amendment
issues on appeal. State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971 n.2 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). The State cites Mclntire not as published
precedent, but simply for its discussion of the issue presented
here.
-7-

claim that the plea was involuntary, this Court found that there
were no issues preserved for consideration on appeal, ^d. at 3.
As in Mclntire and Langdon, defendant's plea, as
reflected in the record on appeal, does not contain specific
language preserving the suppression issue for appeal.

Defendant

cites the certificate of probable cause signed by Judge Page on
October 10, 1989, in support of his assertion the his plea was
conditional (R. 69; Appendix "B"; Certificate of Probable Cause)
(see Br. of App. at 6).

However, defendant's unconditional

guilty plea was entered previously on August 15, 1989 (R. 29;
Appendix "C" ; Minute Entry).

The trial court's minute entry is

the only document in the record on appeal that memorializes the
3
guilty plea proceedings.
The minute entry establishes that
defendant was present and represented by Ron Yengich, that the
court explained to defendant his rights waived by a guilty plea,
and that defendant pled guilty to two counts (R. 29). There is
no indication that the plea was conditional.

Notably, defendant

pled guilty to two of the five pending charges on the same day
that Judge Page denied his motion to suppress (R. 7 7-78; Appendix
"D"; Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress).
Defendant's claim that his plea was conditional appears
to be based upon the fact that the trial judge subsequently
granted a certificate of probable cause (Br. of App. at 6).
However, Sery requires that a conditional plea be entered with
approval of the defendant, the prosecutor and the trial judge at
3
No plea affidavit was executed by defendant in the district
court, and no transcript of the change of plea hearing has been
provided by defendant on appeal.
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In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the
Supreme Court closely examined the standard for determining the
voluntariness of a consent search.

Review was granted to

consider whether voluntary consent requires knowledge of the
right to refuse consent. Ici- at 223. The Court rejected the
argument that consenting to search is analogous to the
requirement that a defendant affirmatively waive the right to
counsel at trial.

The Court held that voluntariness "is a

question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and
while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to
be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a
voluntary consent."

jid. at 248-49 (footnote omitted).

The Utah Supreme Court has similarly established
standards for courts to determine whether a person voluntarily
consented to a search:
[T]he prosecution has the burden of
establishing from the totality of the
circumstances that the consent was
voluntarily given; however, the prosecution
is not required to prove that defendant knev,
of his right to refuse to consent in order to
show voluntariness. Factors which may show a
lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the
absence of a claim of authority to search by
the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition
of force by the officers; 3) a mere request
to search; 4) cooperation by the owner . . .
; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on
the part of the officer.
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (footnotes
omitted); see also State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah Ct.
App.) cert, granted,

Utah Adv. Rep.

(1989); State v.

Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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Defendant cooperated in the search by informing police that they
could find marijuana in the freezer (T. 4, 17).
In ruling on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial
court wrote:
The defendant at the time of the search was
under arrest in his own home by officers who
had probable cause to be there. He was asked
if they could search his residence, and he
did not respond. The officers proceeded to
contact the County Attorney's Office for a
warrant to search and the defendant was
informed that they were doing that. There
was no force exhibited, and no threats were
made to the defendant. A subsequent request
for search was made, and the defendant
responded that "he never said they couldn't,
and that they could go ahead and search."
The defendant was cooperative. No tricks
were employed by the law enforcement
officers, when they said they were attempting
to get a warrant, they were in the process of
getting a warrant from the county attorney.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the consent to search, the Court
concludes that defendant's consent was
voluntarily given, and therefore, the
defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby
denied.
(R. 77-78) (emphasis added).

As the trial court's ruling

indicates, the court scrupulously followed the Whittenback
standards and found four of the five factors for determining
voluntariness of the consent, i.e., no force shown by the
officers, a simple request for the search, cooperation by
defendant, and lack of trick or deception by the officers.
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its
ruling on the motion to suppress because defendant had been
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Unlike Royer and Recalde, defendant was under lawful
arrest and the police had probable cause to obtain a search
warrant.

In fact, defendant does not claim an invalid arrest or

that he mistakenly believed he was required to consent.

Because

defendant was not under an unlawful detention at the time of
consent, Royer and Recalde are unhelpful.
Additionally, defendant cites Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968), arguing that the police engaged in the same
type of trickery disapproved of in Bumper.

The Bumper case

involved police officers who went to the home of Bumper's
grandmother and intimated that they had a search warrant when in
fact they did not.

The Supreme Court reversed Bumper's

conviction, concluding that Bumper's grandmother did not
voluntarily consent to the search where police misled her to
believe that they had a legal right to search her home and that
resistance would be futile.
However, in this case, the police officers did not tell
defendant that they had a search warrant.

They merely told

defendant that they had contacted the county attorney's office
and requested that office to prepare a warrant (T. 3). Defendant
correctly notes that the county attorney's office cannot, itself,
issue a search warrant.

See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190

(Utah 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987).

Defendant's

whole claim is based upon the semantic distinction that defendant
should have been told that a search warrant is merely prepared by
the county attorney but actually signed by a neutral magistrate
(Br. of App. 16).
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and merely informed defendant of the fact that they were
attempting to obtain a warrant.

Defendant was not threatened

with a search warrant if he did not consent.
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desire to "get it over with" that prompted him to consent to the
search.

The police had simply stated the fact that they had

contacted the county attorney's office to seek a search warrant.
Defendant could only infer from that statement that a warrant
would issue if the county attorney followed the legal process in
obtaining a constitutionally valid search warrant.
Noticeably, defendant fails to cite any legal authority
which would have required the police to educate him regarding the
technicalities of the search warrant process.

Where the trial

court found defendant's consent to be voluntary and without the
presence of trickery of coercion, this Court should affirm the
trial court's finding.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM SINCE DEFENDANT
DID NOT ARGUE THE ISSUE IN THE COURT BELOW.
Finally, defendant claims that the police search
violated his rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

Specifically, he argues that the Utah Constitution

requires a police officer to inform a defendant that he has a
right to refuse consent to search his person or property.
Defendant's claim is procedurally barred.
While defendant's motion to suppress cites the Utah
Constitution, his memorandum in support of his motion to suppress
does not analyze or argue state constitutional grounds other than
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rights in any meaningful way in the court below, this Court
should decline to consider his state constitutional claim on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions.

DATED this ,/ ^

day of February, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession oi ?»
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, c
second degree felony. Appellant contends on appeal that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because
there was not sufficient cause to conduct a warrantless
search. We affirm the cor.victior..
Langdon was charged with one count of Unlawful Possession
of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a second
degree felony# in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 58-37-8(1)(iv)(Supp. 1988). Defendant filed a motion to
suppress evidence on April 6, 1988. The motion was denied in
an order entered on May 31, 1988. On June 1, 1988, defendant
moved to continue the trial pending an interlocutory appeal,
but the trial court refused to grant a continuance. Langdon
then sought to change his *not guilty" plea to "no contest.*
The change of plea was heard on June 1, 1988. A Statement of
Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain, Certificates of Counsel and
Order memorialising the change of plea was entered in the trial
court record on June 3, 1988. Langdon was sentenced the same
day to a term •'
* fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The State contends in this appeal that appellant is
precluded from appealing the denial of his motion to suppress
because he entered an unconditional plea of no contes* A~ "'

charge. We agree. The present appeal contains no challenge u_
the validity or voluntariness of the no contest plea. It
raises issues only as to the denial of the suppression motion,
which issues were waived by entry of ax i unconditional no
contest plea.
1 his cour t: discussed the general rule that "a voluntas
guilty plea is a waiver of the right to appeal all
nonjurisdictional issues, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations" in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938
(Utal- 1 988):
This general i: ule of appellate procedure has
been applied in other jurisdictions to preclude
appellate review of fourth amendment issues
where the defendant entered a guilty plea aftlosing the suppression motion. Because the
conviction is based on the plea, rather than i i
the evidence defendant claims was obtained
unconstitutionally, the defendant forfeits the
right to press his fourth amendment claim on
appeal, just as constitutional rights can be
forfeited b] r a failure to raise them i n a ti mel y
fashion.
In Utah this general rule regarding
forfeiture of appellate review of an adverse
ruling and pre-plea motion to suppress applies
with equal force to a defendant who enters an
unconditional no contest plea, which "if
accepted by the court shall have the same effect
as a p] ea of 51 i»J 1 ty
I£. (citations omitted.) In contrast, the general rule is
inapplicable where "the plea entered by the defendant with the
consent of the prosecution and accepted by the trial court
specifically preserves the suppression issue for appeal and
allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant's arguments in favor
of suppression are accepted by the appellate court." Ifl,
There is no indication in the record that the no contest
plea entered by Langdon is a conditional plea of the type
approved in State v. Sery. Paragraph 5 of the signed statement
recites the defendant's acknowledgement that he understands
that "if I were tried and convicted . . . I would have a right
to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of
U t a h * Langdon expressly waived this right to appeal. The only

880370-CA

2

reference to an appeal I s a statement by the judge at the time
of sentencing that, "Even if you appeal, there's no guarantee
your appeal is going to be successful." This statement is
inconsistent with the language of the statement executed by
defendant, his attorney and the prosecutor as to the waiver of
rights and is insufficient to establish that the plea was
intended to be conditional
Because defendant entered an unconditional plea of no
contest to the charges, he waived the right to contest the
denial of the motion to suppress on appeal. No issues
concerning the voluntariness or other aspects of the plea are
raised on appeal, and thus there is no issue preserved for this
court's consideration on appeal.
The judgment Is affirmed.

ALL CONCZ n

Russell W. Bench, Judge

kicharc C. Davidson, Judjae
Norman H

Jackson , Judge
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APPENDIX D

flUo,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLfcL DISTRICT' A*
Sl

M 98S

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE JDF UTAH

. S ^ ; .

STATE OF UTAH,

w.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S

Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

JACKIE EUGENE BOBO,

Criminal No. 6346

Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress, having come on
regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court, and
counsel having stipulated that the matter be submitted based upon
the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and the memorandum
submitted by counsel and the Court having reviewed the transcript
and the memorandum submitted, and being fully advised in the
premises, rules as follows:
The defendant at the time of the search was under
arrest in his own home by officers who had probable cause to be
there.

He was asked if they could search his residence, and he

did not respond.

The officers proceeded to contact the County

Attorney's Office for a warrant to search and the defendant was
informed that they were doing that.
There was no force exhibited, and no threats were made
to the defendant.

A subsequent request for search was made, and

the defendant responded that "he never said they couldn't, and
that they could go ahead and search".

The defendant was

FILMED

cooperative.

No tricks were employed by the law enforcement

officers, when they said they were attempting to get a warrant,
they were in the process of getting a warrant from the county
attorney.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the consent to search, the Court concludes that
defendant's consent was voluntarily given, and therefore, the
defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

)S>*\ day of August, A.D., 1989.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
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